This is part of the text of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, which was sent to the Security Council and could lead to sanctions against Iran.
Board of Governors
GOV/2006/53
Date: 31 August 2006
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
A. Suspension of Enrichment Related Activities
4. Iran has continued the testing of P-1 centrifuges in the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Since 6 June 2006, centrifuges in the single machine test stand and in the 10-machine and 20-machine cascades have been run mostly under vacuum, but with the feeding of UF6 into single machines of the 20-machine cascade for short periods of time. Between 6 and 8 June 2006, the 164-machine cascade was also tested with UF6. Further testing of the 164-machine cascade with UF6 was carried out between 23 June and 8 July 2006.
During these tests, a total of approximately 6 kg of UF6 was fed into the machines and enriched to various levels of U-235. The feeding of UF6 into the 164-machine cascade was resumed on 24 August 2006.
5. In June 2006, Iran stated that it had achieved enrichment levels of 5% U-235 in a test run in the 164-machine cascade.
The installation of a second 164-machine cascade is proceeding. Iran has informed the Agency that it expects to be able to run the cascade under vacuum in September 2006.
On 26 July 2006, design information verification (DIV) was carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, where construction was ongoing. In the course of the inspectors visit to Iran between 11 and 16 August 2006, Iran declined to provide the Agency with access to carry out DIV at FEP, stating that the frequency of DIV activities was, in its view ... The Agency explained that DIV was an ongoing and continuing process, and that it is carried out during all construction, commissioning, operation and subsequent phases of a facility to establish the safeguards measures to be implemented and to ensure that there are no undeclared design features which would permit the diversion of nuclear material. ... Between 26 and 30 August 2006, Iran allowed the Agency access to carry out DIV at FEP
B. Suspension of Reprocessing Activities
There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities in Iran.
D.1. Enrichment Programme
D.1.1. Contamination
11. There has been no further progress on the resolution of the contamination issue ... full implementation of the Additional Protocol (is) necessary for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
D.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology
12. The Agency has continued its investigation of the outstanding questions related to Iran’s P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes ... However, Iran has not made any new information available to the Agency
Uranium Metal
To understand the full scope of the offers made by the intermediaries to Iran, it is still necessary for the Agency to have a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres ... In the course of a visit to Iran in mid-August 2006, Agency inspectors continued their examination of the document. However, Iran informed the inspectors that the taking of notes would not be permitted, and the notes which had been taken thus far by the inspectors during that visit had to be destroyed. The document remains under seal in Iran.
17. The depleted uranium targets which had been irradiated in the course of the plutonium experiments are stored in containers located at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility ... On 8 August 2005, the Agency took environmental samples from one of those containers. The results from their analysis, recently finalised by the Agency, indicate the presence of high enriched uranium particles. On 15 August 2006, Iran was requested to provide information about the source of the contamination and the past use of the containers.
Between the end of July 2006 and 29 August 2006, Iran declined to provide one-year multiple entry visas to designated Agency inspectors as agreed to by Iran in the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. On 30 August 2006, Iran provided such visas for two inspectors, and on 31 August 2006 informed the Agency that following the normal administration process the multiple one year visa for remaining designated inspectors will be issued by 10 September 2006.
Summary
27. Iran has been providing the Agency with access to nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required reports. Although Iran has provided the Agency with some information concerning product assays at PFEP, Iran continues to decline Agency access to certain operating records at PFEP.
28. Iran has not addressed the long outstanding verification issues or provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated with some of its activities. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities; nor has Iran acted in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.
29. The Agency will continue to pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran’s nuclear activities. However, the Agency remains unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations with a view to confirming the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.