For as long as I have been involved in professional military education with Thai military officers (1980s) the idea of a canal across southern Thailand invariably comes up as an essay or paper topic.
Building the Kra canal would be a monumental project taking years if not a decade to complete.
It would involve extending the sea lanes across the Indian Ocean east across southern Thailand to exit at the southern end of the South China Sea and link up with north-south sea lanes.
This would cut sailing time from two to six days for shipping that otherwise would pass through one of three routes: the Malacca. Lombok and Sunda straits.
The Kra canal would also divert sea traffic from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
Singapore would suffer the drop in traffic. Southern Vietnam could benefit as a port could be built to take advantage of this new route. Thailand would benefit from the fees shippers would pay to use the canal.
The passage via the Kra isthmus would by-pass areas where pirates have been active but it would also cross land territory in southern Thailand where Muslim rebels are waging an insurgency.
Thailand would be cut in two physically.
History urges us to be cautious. Building a canal across the Kra isthmus has been a ong-time pipe dream that has never gotten off the ground. In the past cost was a major consideration.
The use of nuclear explosives was even suggested to gouge out the shipping channel.
Today things have changed, China has the funding and could easily link this to its Belt and Road Initiative. Strategically, a canal across the Kra isthmus would alleviate the so-called “Malacca Dilemma” by which the U.S. could choke off this strait to Chinese traffic in a crisis or conflict. Obviously, at the end of the day, China’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative will give China increased influence in the states where the infrastructure is built.
This could be the new “great game” with China marginalizing Singapore, a strong supporter of the U.S.
